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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant
erred

in admitting

Price,

Utah

on

respectfully

submits

that

evidence of the burglary

October

10

or

11,

the trial

court

that occurred

1992, because

there

in
is

absolutely no evidence that links that theft to the Defendant or
the evidence in this case.
Secondly, the trial court erred in ruling that the attempt
by

persons

in the Defendant's

car

to exchange

quarters

for

currency, without more, was sufficient for the officers involved
to form a "reasonable suspicion" justifying the stop of the
Defendant's car on the highway.
Third,

the

trial

court

erred

in denying

the

Defendant's

Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the
Defendant's car on the grounds that the search was without a
warrant or the consent of the Defendant and the officers lacks
the requisite factual basis to form the necessary suspicion to
authorize

the

search.

Additionally,

the

Defendant

was

unreasonably

detained

on the roadway

and based

thereon,

the

evidence from the search should be suppressed
Finally,
defendant's

the

court

statements

erred

in

without

admitting

clear

evidence

independent

of

proof

the
of

a

crime.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE
UNRELATED BURGLARY IN PRICE, UTAH.
The

Appellee,

Appellant's

in

it's

brief,

contention

that

the

does

not

introduction

respond

to

the

of the evidence

concerning the burglary of coin and vending machines in Price,
Utah

constituted

reversible

error.

The only mention, by the

State, of that evidence is on page thirty-six of the appellee's
brief in which the State argues that the evidence was properly
admitted to establish the corpus delicti of the crime (Appellee's
brief, p. 36).
The alleged theft in Price, Utah occurred on October 10 or
11, 1992 in Price. The Defendant was stopped on October 27, 1992,
sixteen days later.

The theft was not discovered by the 7-11

store manager in Price until the morning of October 12, 1992.
There is no evidence that the seven oriental
were

seen by

the

store

clerk

at the 7-11

individuals that

on October

10 had

anything to do with the theft as opposed to other patrons or
employees of the store. There is not even a scintilla of evidence

2

that the Defendant had anything to do with the burglary.

There

was no physical evidence introduced by the State that tied the
Defendant to the crime and there was nothing in the Defendant's
statements or in the other evidence relating the Defendant to the
crime.

The computer board supposedly stolen from the 7-11 was

not found in the possession of the Defendant or his companions
and the cutters found with other regular tools in the car being
driven by the Defendant were not, by stipulation of the parties,
the cutters that cut the lock of the 7-11 in Price.
The
which

evidence

the

and testimony

Defendant

could

not

about the crime
be

linked

in Price, to

consumed

the

major

portion of the trial.
The argument of the State that the evidence was used only to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime is blatantly false.
The evidence of the Price burglary was used from the onset for
the purpose of establishing reasonable suspicion for the stop, a
basis for the warrantless search and as evidence of the corpus
delicti of the crime.

The tentacles of the improper evidence

reached into every aspect of this case.

The relevant provisions

of the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which
document the infiltration of the evidence are as follows:
Findings of Fact
3.

Dispatchers contacted Price and were told that

Price Police were investigating a recent burglary
and theft involving large numbers of quarters from
a video arcade game.

3

16.

On October 10, 1992, a 7-11 in Price was burglar-

ized.

At approximately 2:00 a.m. seven oriental indi-

viduals entered the store and began playing video
games which they did for approximately forty minutes.
The individuals then left and the clerk did not notice
anything

wrong

with

the

video

machine.

At

the

beginning of the next shift it was noticed that the
video machine was blank and not operating.

The owner

checked the machine and discovered that the lock to
the coin box had been cut, the door to the coin
collection box pried opened and the coin box removed.
The

Price

City

Police

were

called

to the

7-11

on

October 12, 1992 and an official report was taken and
an investigation started.
17.

It was stipulated that the bolt cutters seized

in the car the Defendant was driving was excluded as
having cut the lock on the 7-11 in Price.
Conclusions of Law
1.

The initial stop of the automobile being driven by

the Defendant was lawful being based upon reasonable
suspicion that the Defendant or the occupants of the
car were involved in video burglaries in the Price area
or that the occupants of the car contained evidence
which

may

have

been

relevant

to

the

Price

investigation.
3.

The warrantless search of the automobile was based
4

upon probable cause and exigent circumstances. More
specifically, a reasonable person in viewing the evidence available to the officers could have concluded
that

it was likely that the automobile contained

evidence relevant to a burglary or theft of coins
in the Price area. . . .(Emphasis added)
R. 107-111.
The trial court's findings establish first that Maxine
Barker, the owner/manager of the restaurant in Spanish Fork
Canyon observed a car occupied by five oriental individuals who
attempted to sell her quarters wrapped in yellow notebook paper
(R.

112-13).

Secondly,

that

based

upon calls to other

establishments in Spanish Fork Canyon it was determined that
attempts to sell quarters at other establishments had occurred
(R. 111).

It is against that factual background that the court

makes it's finding, quoted above, that Price authorities wanted
to question the individuals with regard to a "recent" burglary or
theft.
The facts are that the alleged burglary or theft in Price
could not be related to having been committed by the Defendant
and his traveling companions and had occurred approximately
sixteen or seventeen days prior to the time the Defendant was
stopped in the canyon.

Further, there is no evidence that Price

authorities wanted to question the Defendant and his companions
with regard to the 7-11 burglary.

The only mention of the carbon

county authorities was in the testimony of Shannon Horn, a Utah
5

County dispatcher, where she testified:
Q.

Was Carbon County contacted?

A.

I contacted Rosaline at Carbon County in
their dispatch.

She's a dispatcher.

And

she told me, yes, that they had thefts and
burglaries and vending machines where quarters
had been taken.
T. 37, Lines 6 to 10; 39, Lines 6 to 16; 40, Lines 2 to 17.
There is no testimony indicating that anyone want in Carbon
County

wanted

to

talk

to

the

Defendant

and

his

companions,

regarding the burglary at the 7-11 or that anyone provided a date
associated with any thefts of vending machines in Price, upon
which

someone

could

conclude

that

the

burglaries

were

even

recent.
Penney
Department
Defendant

Turner,
of

was

the

Public

dispatcher

Safety,

stopped

she

for

testified

received

the

the
that

Highway

Patrol,

on

day

the

that

was

the

information

forwarded to the officers regarding the matter from only the Utah
County Dispatcher (Tr. 43, Line 1 to

44, Line 21).

It is clear that from the simple tidbit of information that
there had been unspecified burglaries in the Carbon County area,
from a dispatcher in Price communicated to the dispatcher in Utah
County,

came

a factual

scenario

that was communicated

to the

officers making the stop of the Defendant that was without any
basis

in

fact.

The

distortions

in

the

actual

information

obtained by the dispatchers grew each time it was provided to

6

another

dispatcher

or

officer.

Exhibit

11, attached

in the

Addendum to this brief contains copies of the actual notes of the
Utah Highway Patrol dispatchers, which information came from the
Utah County Dispatchers.

As noted on page four of the Exhibit,

Rash of burglaries throughout the State
Asian gang 7-lls and vend machines
Printed circ board bolt cutters quarters
Exhibit 6.
Patrolman Dennis Shields who made the traffic stop was told
by dispatch that Price City wanted to talk to the individuals
about the burglary (Tr. 58, Lines 18 to 23).
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." Rule 401 U.R.E.

Further, Rule 404(b) of the Utah

Rules of Evidence provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is a question of law
and is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness.
trial court's underlying

The

factual determination should be given

deference by the appellate court and should only be overruled
when they are clearly erroneous. State v. O'Neil, 206 Utah Adv.
Rep. 14, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App.1993).
7

In this case, the trial

court made no factual findings related to the evidence except
that the court overruled the objections of the defense to it's
introduction (Tr. 10, L. 25 to 11, L. 10; 14, L.24 to 15, L.3;
23, Lines 5 to 8 ) .
There was no evidence during the entire trial that linked
the Defendant to the burglary in Price that occurred sixteen days
before he was stopped.

The introduction and use of that evidence

to validate "reasonable suspicion," a warrantless search, the
corpus

delicti

of a crime was error

and because

of the

significance placed upon it by the court, was reversible error.
On appeal, this Court must determine whether there is a
reasonable likelihood, absent the error, of an outcome more
favorable to the Defendant.

Sate v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-

40 (Utah 1992); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Utah 1989);
State v. Cloud, 722 P. 2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986). Given the fact
that the trial court used the evidence to decide each major issue
of this case from the basis for the stop, search and as evidence
of the corpus delicti of the crime, there is no question that a
difference result, more favorable to the Defendant, would have
occurred.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
STOP OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER.
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Deitman,
739 P. 2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) describes the three levels of
encounters between police and citizens as follows:
8

(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize
a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion"
that the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed or
is being committed.
Id., (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th
Cir.

1984),

cert,

denied,

Hartsel v. United

States, 476 U.S.

1142, 106 S. Ct. 2250 (1986)).
There is no question that when a law enforcement official
stops

a

motor

participants

vehicle,

therein

the

a

"seizure"

rights

occurs,

guaranteed

by

giving
the

the

Fourth

Amendment. State v. Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah App. 1989).
As stated by the Court in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88
(Utah App. 1987), a seizure under the Fourth Amendment must be
based

on

rational

specific

articulable

inferences

drawn

from

facts,
them,

which,

would

together

lead

with

a reasonable

person to conclude that the defendant had committed or was about
to commit a crime.
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968) required that an officer be
able

to point

to

"specific

and

articulable

facts which

taken

together with rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably

warrant that intrusion.

..."

Utah has codified the requirement of reasonable suspicion in
Utah Code Annotated 77-7-15 (1990):
9

A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of committing or
is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of
his actions.
See also: State v. Deitman, supra. at 617-18.
In determining

the

existence

of

"reasonable

suspicion,"

courts are to engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis
to determine whether there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal
conduct.

State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991),

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
The State
Shields,

who

suspicion"

argues that the information
made

was

the

the

stop,

that

information

known to Patrolman

constituted

regarding

the

a

"reasonable

attempt

to sell

quarters, and the information contained on the Attempt to Locate
communicated to him by dispatch (Appellee's Brief, pp. 17-23).
The State argues that the simple attempt to exchange coins
for currency is sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion
(Appellee's brief, p. 21-22).

Not one of the cases cited by the

State recite only the tangential evidence produced in this case
and even then, do not condone anything other than a momentary
first level stop. State v. Sell, 496 P. 2d 44 (Or. App. 1972);
People

v.

Evans,

32

111. App.3d

865, 336 N.E.2d

792

(1975);

People v. Beard, 35 111.App.3d 725, 342 N.E.2d 343 (1976); State
v. Maxie, 377 P.2d 435 (Wash. 1962).
It is submitted that the stop of the Defendant was made by
the officers based upon the alleged statement that officials in
Price wanted to talk to the Defendant and his companions, which
10

statement has no basis in the testimony.

Any attempt now to

elevate the simple process of exchanging coins for currency into
a

suspicious

activity, without more, does not meet the tests

adopted by this Court.

There was not a factual basis sufficient

to form a reasonable suspicion to make the stop of the Defendant.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS BASED UPON THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE.
The most

blatant

misinterpretation

of

the

facts by

the

State relates to the contention that the warrantless search was
justified. The State points to:
Although the coins in both Maxie and Beard
were arguably more distinctive than those involved in
this case, the important similarity between the three
cases is that the investigating officers knew that the
coins in question were the same type as those that
had been recently stolen in nearby burglaries. . . .
Appellee's Brief, pp. 29-30.
actually

obtained

burglaries.

No

from

The facts are that the information

Price

reference

was

as

only

that

to a time

there

period,

had

number

been
and

specifically to the 7-11 burglary occupying the bulk of evidence
at trial was mentioned by the Carbon County dispatcher.
The State continues:
In this case, the officers had a report involving
the recent theft of quarters from vending machines
11

in a neighboring county.

When coupled with

Defendantf s suspicious conduct as reported by
ordinary citizens, that report takes on added
significance.
Appellee's Brief, p. 31.

As indicated above, there is absolutely

no factual basis for the conclusion that there had been recent
burglaries or thefts.

There was no indication by the Carbon

County dispatcher as to particular crimes or dates they occurred
and absolutely no reference to the denomination of the coins.
Lastly, the State contends that the Defendant's unresponsive
answers

and

failure

to

provide

information

related

to

the

ownership of the vehicle constituted cause for the warrantless
search

(Appellee's Brief 33-34).

The State also argued

that

Officer Hill has properly concluded that the vehicle might have
been stolen and that fact justified the search (Appellee's Brief,
p. 9 ) .
The problem

with

the

argument of the State

is that the

search was already conducted by the other officers when Officer
Hill

had

accumulated

the

information

relied upon.

Patrolman

Shields testified that after he stopped the vehicle, he asked the
Defendant

if he had

a large

Defendant answered "no."

amount of quarters to which the

The officer then got the Defendant out

of the vehicle, took the keys out of the ignition and learned
that the Defendant was returning from Denver and that the car
belonged to a friend.

At that juncture, Detective Hill arrived

on the scene and took the Defendant back to his vehicle

12

(Tr. 57,

L. 14 to 62, Line 16).
Deputy Hill testified that as he started his interrogation
and before he had obtained any damaging information and relayed
it to other officers, the search had already been conducted (Tr.
74, L. 9 to 79, L. 7 ) . There is no question that the information
relied upon by Detective Hill was obtained subsequent to the time
the search was actually conducted and the information he obtained
was not

relied

upon by the other officers

in conducting

the

search.
The Utah

Supreme Court in State v. Limb, 581 P. 2d 142

(Utah

1978) adopted the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), allowing the warrantless
search

of

an

automobile

possess probable

cause

where

the

for the

law

search

enforcement
and there

officers

are exigent

circumstances justifying the warrantless search.
As detailed

in the previous point, there was no probable

cause for search of the vehicle as defined by this Court.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION BASED UPON THE ABSENCE
OF INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE.
As

established

occurring

sixteen

above, there
days

Defendant was driving.

before

was

the

evidence

stop

of

of

the

some

crime

vehicle

the

There is no question that the Defendant

was not connected at any time, even by his own statements to that

13

crime.

Accordingly,

statement

there

ultimately

given

is no
by

evidence,

the

apart

Defendant

of

from
a

the

crime.

Accordingly, the trial court allowed evidence of his confession
to be introduced

before

crime was introduced.

sufficient

independent

evidence of a

Utah law on the subject is established by

State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 P.2d 353 (Utah 1957).
In that
universal that

case

the

Court

noted

an extrajudicial

that

the

"rule

is quite

confession, by itself, is not

sufficient to sustain a conviction of a crime, but there must be
evidence, independent of the confession to establish the corpus
delicti." _Id at 354.

The rule established in the English common

law was to prevent the conviction of the innocent on the strength
of false confessions. Id. at 354.
In

defining

a

test

to

describe

the

quantum

of

proof

necessary to establish the crime and satisfy the requirement, the
Court stated:
Although they vary, it seem quite generally agreed
that the evidence of the corpus delicti need not
be "beyond reasonable doubt," "conclusive" or
"sufficient to warrant a conviction," independent
of other evidence. From a perusal of such authorities
it seem to us, that the generally accepted view, to
which we give our approval, is that the evidence
independent of the confession need not establish the
corpus delicti by separate, full or positive proof,
and that the whole evidence, including the confession,
may be considered together in determining whether
the corpus delicti has been satisfactorily established
. . . . (Emphasis added)
Id. at 356. Justice Crockett then stated that the rule to be
employed is that there must "be independent, clear and convincing
evidence of the corpus delicti. . . . " Id. at 357. See also,
14

State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 P. 2d 173 (Utah 1954).
There is no serious question that there was not independent
evidence of a crime established by clear and convincing proof to
warrant the introduction of the Defendant's statement.
CONCLUSION
The testimony in this case establishes that the trial court
improperly allowed evidence of the burglary in Price to inundate
every aspect of the Defendant's trial.
sufficient

to support

The evidence was not

a finding of a reasonable

suspicion to

support the stop and certainly does not support a finding of
probable cause to support the length and duration of the stop and
the warrantless search of the vehicle
Finally, there was no independent evidence of a crime, apart
from the confession and the conviction on that basis, should be
reversed.
Dated this

/fT day of March, 1994.

Steven B. Killp^kvEsq.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that four (4) copies of the Appellant's Brief were
mailed to Jan Graham, Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84114, on this

/<f day of March, 1994.

15

A D D E N D U M

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

DIVISION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND TECHNICAL SERVICES
K.D. Simpson
Norman H. Bangcrter
Governor
D. Douglas Bodrero
Commissioner
Brant L. Johnson
Deputy Commissioner

4501 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City. Utah 84119
(801)965-4480
(801) 965-4756 Fax

January 20, 1993

Date:

TO:

Dint-tor

Whom it May Concern:

REFERENCE:

Subpoena/Ducas Tecum

A.

The attached document(s) is a true and correct copy of the materials
on file with the Salt Lake Coimiunications Dispatch Center, Department
of Public Safety, State of Utah; also/or,

B.

The enclosed cassette tape is an accurate copy of the requested
material on
between the hours of
and
, from beginning to end with no omissions, no
speeded up tape and no gaps, to the best of my knowledge-

C.

Reference Case Number

692-2249

Agency

Utah

Highway Patrol

Salt Lake Communications Center
Department of Public Safety
State of Utah

Signature and Title

Bureau of Criminal Identification
Richard J. Townsend
Bureau Chief
965-4445

State Crime Lab
Robert W. Brinkman
Bureau Chief
965-4487

Communications Bureau
Carol J. Groustra
Bureau Chief
965-4085

Regulatory Licensing
Clyde K. Ormond
Bureau Chief
965-4484
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CASE REPORT:

CALLS FOR SERVICE

00.Agency: U UHP-UTAH COUNTY

DATE PRINTED:

Ol.Inc #:

03.Date Reported: 10/27/92 04.Time Reported: 1045
05.Activity: ASTQA ASSIST OTHER AGENCY
03. City

[

ll.Apttt

01/19/93

92071169 Q2.Rec By: PENNY
OS.Shift: 1 7AM - 3PM_

07.Priority: 2 -ASAP

09.Loc NB IIS V MAIN AF

Name

16.Add: _

10.B/R 0000U1

Tel

17.City

Kow Rec _ Type

18.St:

19.Rem: 5 M/OHIENTALS IN GRY/WHITE TOYT LIC/0S7EHV.
20.Units: 0169 0060 035S 0433

30.Off:

32.Disp 1045 Enrt 1045 Arr 1045 Comp 1244 *Transp* Enrt
39.Other Agcy:

41.Ad: _ 4 2 . D s p By:

Arr

Comp

43.Case#: 592000002249 44-Dispo: 4

45.Line-1: DUFFLE BAG, 75 LBS FILLED WITH QUARTERS. INDIVIDUALS WANTED
46.Line-2: FOR THEFT OF QUARTERS FROM VENDING MACHINES THROUGHOUR CARBON
47.Line-3: EMERY UTAH AND SL COUNTYS.

ALL 5 WERE ARRESTED AND TAKEN TO

4B.Line-4: AM FORK PD (APPARENTLY FOR QUESTIONING) 159 TURNED THE CASE OVER
4 S % L m e - S : TO UTAHl.CO X'ETECTIVES , UHP ASSISTED IN ARREST *

TSLUCPHCT

CASE REPORT:

CALLS FOR SERVICE

00.Agency: U UHP-UTAH COUNTY

DATE PRINTED:

Ol.Inc ft: 92071169 02.Eec By: PENNY

03.Date Reported: 10/27/92 04.Time Reported: 1045
OS.Activity: ASTOA ASSIST OTHER AGENCY
03.City

ll.Apttt

01/19/93

OS.Shift: 1 7AM - 3PM_

07.Priority: 2 -ASAP

09.Loc MB 115 W MAIN AF

Name

15.Add:

10.B/R 0000UN

Tel

17.City

Kow Rec _ Type _

18.St:

19.Rem: 5 M/ORIEMTALS IN GRY/WHITE TOYT LIC/0S7EHV.
20. Units: 0169 0050 03SS 0433

30.0££:

32.Disp 104S Enrt 1045 Arr 1045 Coap 1244 *Transp* Enrt
39.Other Agcy:

41.Ad: _42.Dsp By:

Arr

Coap

43.Case#: 692000002249 44.Dispo: 4

45.Line-1: DUFFLE BAG, 75 LBS FILLED WITH QUARTERS. INDIVIDUALS WANTED
46.Line-2: FOR THEFT OF QUARTERS FROM VENDING MACHINES THROUGHOUR CARBON
47. Line-3: EMERY UTAH AND SL COUNTYS.

ALL S WERE ARRESTED AND TAKEN TO

48. Line-4: AM FORK PD (APPARENTLY FOR QUESTIONING) 169 TURNED THE CASE OVER

